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ry of the Labyrinths) (2002), Φωτιές του Ιούδα, Στάχτες του 
Οιδޖποδα (Fires of Judas, Ashes of Oedipus) (2009) and Θα 
υπογράφω Λουޖ (I shall Sign as Loui) (1993) lend themselves to 
a re-examination of the past from the point of view of the present 
and for the sake of the present. The past must be accepted as an 
“impassable truth”. One can arrive at such a liberating interpre-
tation after dismantling constructions of racial superiority, misog-
yny, the haunting of personal, collective or national traumas, and 
even the legacy of revolutionary idealism. Such an interpretation 
might prove helpful in dealing with contemporary challenges to 
identity at a time of new geo-political tensions, mass migration 
and rising neoliberal populism.
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“What is a century?” asks Badiou as he embarks on an exploration of the twentieth century through 
art and literature.1 “When does a century begin and end?” asks Andreas Papaoulakis in Ο αιώνας των 
Λαβυρίνθων (The century of the Labyrinths).2 If the length of a century is to be determined by his-
torical and political standards, such as war and revolution, then the twentieth century is articulated 
around two World Wars and the rise and fall of communism. If a century is the site of apocalyptic 
events, then counting the dead becomes the measure of our judgement. If the criteria are econom-
ic, then the twentieth century is definitely the century of the triumph of capitalism and the global 
markets. 
In this paper I draw on three of Rhea Galanaki’s novels, Ο αιώνας των Λαβυρίνθων (The century of 
the Labyrinths), Φωτιές του Ιούδα, Στάχτες του Οιδίποδα (Fires of Judas, Ashes of Oedipus), and Θα 
υπογράφω Λουί (I shall Sign as Loui) in order to examine ways in which the impossibility of precise 
historical determination makes room for philosophical, political, ideological, and aesthetic explo-
rations of subjectivity in our time. “Our time” is roughly the twentieth century. Its boundaries are 
elastic, starting, as it does in Ο αιώνας των Λαβυρίνθων, in 1878; harking back to the earlier decades 
of that century in Θα υπογράφω Λουޖ; and extending well into the new millennium in Φωτιές του 
Ιούδα, Στάχτες του Οιδίποδα. The relaxation of chronological conventions, a staple trope in Galanaki’s 
toolbox, brings into focus repetitions, cycles, trends, patterns, tensions, and actions which intersect 
with one another, forming a dense nexus of interdependent events and quasi-causalities; a labyrinth. 
Galanaki is a child of the twentieth century and bears witness to her time from a progressive ideo-
logical position that entails a genuine concern for the future. Her aim, it seems to me, is similar to 
Badiou’s: “Not to judge the century as an objective datum, but rather to ask how it has come to be 
subjectivated.”3 Non-judgement and emphasis on subjectivation lead to the possibility—or better, 
the responsibility—to re-examine the past in order to act politically in the present. I consider Gala-
naki’s voice a European voice which is uniquely Greek in its idiomatic specificity.4 By emplacing her 
work in the European context, I do not seek to establish close literary parallels or direct influences. 
Rather, I use the European century as a broad socio-political and historical frame of reference.5
Badiou argues that the European twentieth century is characterized by the following trends: first, 
an appetite for the new and the absolute—absolute art, perpetual peace, ultimate truth, ideological 
victory, and universality; second, an intense historicity—that is, the conviction that the new century 
1 Alain Badiou, The Century, trans. Alberto Toscano (London: Polity Press, 2007), 1.
2 Rhea Galanaki, Ο αιώνας των Λαβυρίνθων (Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Καστανιώτη, 2005), 92. Unless otherwise noted, all transla-
tions are my own.
3 Badiou, The Century, 5.
4 For an overview of Greek literature in the post-dictatorship era, see Roderick Beaton, An Introduction to Modern Greek 
Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
5 For Greek Literature in the European context, see Peter Mackridge and Eleni Yannakakis, Contemporary Greek Fiction 
in a United Europe: From Local History to the Global Individual (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). For Galanaki’s 
novels in an international context, see Annabel M. Patterson, The International Novel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2014).
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would make possible what the nineteenth had only promised;6 third, a view of war as an inevitable 
form of violence that would, paradoxically, bring an end to violence. The Second World War, for in-
stance, would settle the scores of the “bad” First World War.7 The century starts with polymorphous 
creativity and the promise of change, but hope is immediately followed by something resembling a 
long tragedy (the era of 1914-28) and “the unfeeling manipulation of human material.”8 Badiou is 
keen to add that the relationship between hope and violence in the twentieth century is not a dialec-
tical one, but takes the form of disjunctive synthesis. The failure of dialectical resolution characterizes 
the century from beginning to end, whilst “end” and “beginning” remain unreconciled and in tension. 
The prevalent law of the twentieth century, then, is not the one or the multiple but the two, which 
excludes unanimous submission and combinatory equilibrium.9  
Let us take the irreconcilable tension between end and beginning and the law of the Two as our 
point of departure. In the three novels below, the tension between end and beginning materializes as 
a question of memory and allegiance to historical collective ideals. Allegiance often pitches one group 
against another and threatens to re-open the rifts of political division. Greek history, as we know, 
is replete with examples of bitter divisions between the Left and the Right and a long memory of 
catastrophes and disasters. Yet memory always inheres its opposite; forgetting and oblivion. 
Ο αιώνας των Λαβυρίνθων starts in 1878 with the forgotten archaeological excavation of Knossos by 
the local άρχοντας (grandee) Minos Kalokairinos. The venture is superseded by the massacre of the 
citizens of Herakleion in 1898 and the disappearance of Kalokairinos’s niece, Skevo. The memory 
of the two events is disseminated by Kalokairinos’s assistant, the teacher Christos Papaoulakis, who 
passes them on to others. His son, Andreas, is particularly affected by this legacy, especially the disap-
pearance of Skevo; a woman he never met. The novel then narrates the life of the Papaoulakis family 
from approximately 1918 to 1978. The mystery of Skevo’s disappearance and the rumors surround-
ing her fate are transmitted by Andreas to his niece Ariadne, who is keen to know more. 
Seen from the point of view of “human material,” Ο αιώνας των Λαβυρίνθων is a testimony of the 
frailty of human life. Seen as a narrative of memory, it invites us to consider the imperative of re-
membering and the necessity of forgetting. In psychoanalytic terms, oblivion is a necessity both to 
society and to the individual,10 while memory is living matter and constantly assumes new forms.11 
Some events are truly forgotten, creatively dismantled and absorbed into the unconscious. Other 
events are merely suspended from consciousness returning all the more powerful and haunting. 
6 Badiou, The Century, 32.
7 Ibid., 34.
8 Ibid., 37.
9 As Badiou writes: “In the twentieth century, the shared law of the world is neither the One nor the Multiple: it is the 
Two. It is not the One, because there is no harmony, no hegemony of the simple, no unified power of God. It is not the 
Multiple, because it is not a question of obtaining a balance of powers or a harmony of faculties. It is the Two, and the 
world represented by the modality of the Two excludes the possibility of both unanimous submission and combinatory 
equilibrium. One simply must decide.” Badiou, The Century, 37.
10 Marc Augé, Oblivion, trans. Marjolijn de Jager and James E. Young (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2004).
11 Susannah Radstone, The Sexual Politics of Time: Confession, Nostalgia, Memory (London: Routledge, 2007).
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Galanaki invites us to consider the dual nature of memory and forgetting, aware of the dimension of 
duty that often binds individuals and groups to certain forms of remembering. An important person-
al, political, and ethical question arises at the end of the twentieth century: what do we do with this 
labyrinth that is memory and non-origin? 
The tension of the Two underlines the relationship between the individual and the group. The twen-
tieth century saw the rise of individualism, the loss of tradition, and important gains in the field of 
women’s rights,12 but in Φωτιές του Ιούδα sexism joins forces with racism and social conservatism. 
At one point in the book, a young woman, Martha, arrives at a remote Cretan village to take up her 
post as a teacher. Martha is attracted to this village by her desire to know more about her maternal 
grandmother, after whom she was named; but the young Martha does not know that her grandmoth-
er—referred to as Marta, throughout this text—the old Marta had entered into an incestuous rela-
tionship with her cousin Zaharis, an “abomination” for which the village erased them from its mem-
ory. Martha, who is Jewish on her father’s side and from Athens, is treated as ξένη (outsider, stranger) 
by the locals, and their negative attitudes are reinforced by the local male teacher, a racist-nationalist 
whose sexual advances Martha repels. The narrative culminates on Easter Sunday, with the custom 
of burning an effigy of Judas. In the local version of this story, Judas is not only a “traitor” but also 
αιμομޖκτης (incestuous). Galanaki traces the provenance of this version of the story to two thirteenth 
century manuscripts which conflate the biblical Judas with the ancient Greek Oedipus. 
In discussing this novel we will focus on the loss of collective memory and the descent into misogyny 
and racial prejudice. What does the retreat from sovereign reason and the amnesia of the villagers 
show? What kind of knowledge is denied and why? One of the fundamental tenets of psychoanaly-
sis is that defensive behaviours, like racism and misogyny, have deep psychic roots, but scholars like 
Cornelius Castoriadis have noted the ways in which these defensive behaviours erupt under specific 
historical circumstances.13 Galanaki approaches both racism and misogyny from the oblique angle 
of the unexamined way of life, allowing them to illuminate a community’s impasses in the present. 
At the end of the twentieth century Galanaki invites us to re-examine the content of the concepts 
“woman,” “individual,” and “otherness,” both in relation to being and in relation to history. 
Such a project is both personal and political. Taken to its radical limits, it confronts one with perma-
nent change, a goal always deferred and yet to be achieved: “Η Επανάστασις εޖναι ο νόμος της προόδου” 
(Revolution is the ordinance of progress) writes the young Andreas Rigopoulos, the historical figure 
behind the fictional Louis of Θα υπογράφω Λουί.14 At the end of his life the same man still tries to 
determine whether one can indeed be faithful to a permanent revolution, to ruptures and breaks. 
Louis, who is born on the eve of the Greek Revolution (1821), is imbued with the spirit of the En-
lightenment and the revolutionary idealism of the nineteenth century, but ends his own life in 1897. 
Written in the epistolary genre, the feminine genre par excellence, the novel is an apology, a love 
12 Ulrich Beck and Elizabeth Beck-Gernsheim, Individualization: Institutionalized Individualism and its Social and Politi-
cal Consequences (London: Sage, 2002).
13 Helène Joffe, Risk and the Other (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Cornelius Castoriadis, World in 
Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis, and the Imagination, trans. David Ames Curtis (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1997), 26.
14 Rhea Galanaki, Θα υπογράφω Λουί (Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Καστανιώτη, 2005), 118.
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letter, and a last will and testament addressed to his lover, Louisa. 
A comment by Badiou chimes with the hero’s strong convictions. The twentieth century, he writes: 
Is the project of rupture and foundation that sustains—within the domain of history 
and the state—the same subjective tonality as the scientific, artistic, and sexual rup-
tures the beginning of the century. Hence, it can be argued that the century has been 
faithful to its prologue. Ferociously faithful.15
It is this notion of fidelity that we focus on in Θα υπογράφω Λουί. What might it mean today, 
post-communism, post-modernity, post-feminism, post-truth? As Badiou asks: “What are our axi-
oms?”16 The twentieth century has been dominated by psychoanalysis as a mode of thinking about 
subjectivity. The introduction of psychoanalysis into political philosophy, especially its alliance with 
Marxism, sought to produce a better understanding of collective behaviours as complex behaviours 
encompassing koinonia (society), polis (city), psyche (soul) and logos (speech).17 The relationship be-
tween the individual and the group is seen as a place that may produce uncertainty over how to act 
or proceed, as a site of irresolute tension: on the one hand, the individual is socio-politically deter-
mined; yet, one should always retain a modicum of difference from the other. This “other” is both ex-
ternal (e.g., the group to which one belongs) and internal or unconscious (e.g., the investments and 
affective links that tie one to symbolic ideas and ideals). At stake, therefore, is the concept of differ-
ence from the other as well as from oneself. The latter harks back to the philosophical notion of being 
qua irreducible to either the speaking subject or the cultural forms identity might take. It could be 
argued, therefore, that the conceptualization of individuality/subjectivity as fragmented and divided 
remains the most dominant theoretical conceptualization of the relationship between the individual, 
the group, and the abstract ideals or axioms by which they abide. 
The re-examination of history from the present and for the present is a political, subjective, ideolog-
ical, cultural and aesthetic endeavor.18 Europe is in the throes of a divisive economic, political and 
15 Badiou, The Century, 8. Emphasis mine.
16 Ibid., 164.
17 Koinonia, polis, psyche and logos are the four sections of Castoriadis’s political-psychoanalytic volume, World in 
Fragments.
18 For Greek women writers’ treatment of history see Tatiana Aleksic, “Making Patriarchal History Women’s Own: Eu-
genia Fakinou’s The Seventh Garment,” in Sanja Badhun-Raunovic and Julie Rajan, Myth and Violence in Contemporary 
Female Text: New Cassandras (Bodmin: Ashgate, 2011), 143-160; Georgia Gotsi, “A Garment of One’s Own: Eugenia 
Fakinou’s re-imagining of the Greek Past,” in Mediterranean Historical Review 15, no. 5 (2008), 91-110; Gotsi, “‘Home 
Identity’? Immigrant Voices in Contemporary Greek Fiction,” Journal of Modern Greek Studies 30, no. 2 (2012), 155-
189; and Georgia Farinou-Malamatari, “The Representation of the Balkans in Modern Greek Fiction of the 1990s,” in 
Dimitris Tziovas, Greece and the Balkans: Identities, Perspectives, and Cultural Encounters Since the Enlightenment (Bodmin: 
Ashgate, 2003), 249-61. For history and the past in Modern Greek literature see Dimitris Tziovas, “Centrifugal Topog-
raphies, Cultural Allegories, and Metafictional Strategies in Greek Fiction Since 1974,” in Peter Mackridge and Eleni 
Yannakakis, Contemporary Greek Fiction in a United Europe: From Local History to the Global Individual (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 24-49; and Vangelis Calotychos, “Thorn in the Side of Venice? Galanaki’s Pasha and Pamuk’s 
White Castle in the Global Market,” in Dimitris Tziovas, Greek Modernism and Beyond (Lanham: Rowman and Little-
field Publishers, 1997), 243-260; and Calotychos, “(Pre)occupied Space: Hyphens, Apostrophes, and Over-sites in the 
Literary Imagining of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey,” in Mehmet Yashin, Step-Mothertongue: From Nationalism to Multicul-
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social crisis. The unchecked advance of capitalism; the changing relationship between supra-national 
economic institutions, the citizen, and the state; and the traumatic impact of austerity, especially in 
the South, seem to leave little room for optimism and hope.19 Worse, they often give rise to conflict-
ing reactions, from unreserved self-blame to misdirected aggression, nationalism, sexism, racism, and 
even narratives that history is repeating itself, society having fallen again into the hands of old “ene-
mies.”20 To be able to distinguish between new and old crises; between new and old ideals and duties; 
between what is worth keeping and what should be jettisoned; and even between what is “ours” and 
what is “theirs” without exacerbating imaginary rivalries requires a perspective on history which starts 
with axioms. Crises and revolutions seem to break out all of a sudden, but their incubation takes 
time. In Galanaki’s work, which spans decades, we find a fine record of this long and often unseen 
process, rooted in uncertain obligations that come back to haunt us as unredeemed debts and un-
settled accounts with the past. Addressing these challenges, approaching history in a critical manner, 
means dealing with ghosts and vulnerability whilst finding the strength to traverse, transgress, and 
interpret. To welcome vulnerability and haunting is a sign of “health,” both individual and collective. 
Galanaki’s concept of the Labyrinth, I wish to argue, is an expression of such a disposition; a much 
needed one in the current historical moment.
The Labyrinth as “Impassable True” and Imagination 
At the beginning of The Century of the Labyrinths, Minos Kalokairinos has a fine Arabian horse.21 
When he rides in the narrow streets of Herakleion, the blind beggars think he is Saint Minas, the 
local saint, on horseback. Kalokairinos is rich and lives in a big fine house by the harbor (13). On 
the eve of the excavation he lays awake, conscious of the importance of his endeavor and as nervous 
as a man about to take holy communion (17). His excavation turns up 365 pieces, one for every 
day of the year, as the local teacher, Christos Papaoulakis, says, but is unexpectedly stopped twenty 
days later by the local Turkish authorities. Soon the venture is forgotten, finally superseded by Evan’s 
discovery of the Minoan palace. Christos Papaoulakis, however, preserves that memory of the exca-
vation, narrating it to his children, his pupils, and the men in the kafeneion (café). He feels that the 
story ought to be transmitted orally, as “letters” are not good for everything (27). 
A momentous event that did not quite materialize is a deferred beginning.22 In other words, it is an 
origin which is comprised of deferral and delay—a (non)event that is destined, by its very nature, 
to be enveloped in forgetting; and forgetting is fertile, and almost always a beginning of sorts. Such 
a beginning has nothing to do with the assertive narratives of origin often deployed by nations or 
turalism: Literatures of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey (London: Middlesex University Press, 2000), 49-69.
19 Wolfgang Streek, How Will Capitalism End? (London: Verso, 2016).
20 D. M. Knight, “Cultural Proximity: Crisis, Time, and Social Memory in Central Greece,” History and Anthropology 
23, no. 3 (2012), 349-374.
21 Galanaki, Ο αιώνας των Λαβυρίνθων, 9.
22 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and George Collins (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 188.
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groups to boost the legitimacy of their claims on land, time or a specific course of action.23 Deferred 
beginnings are fragile, supported by a sense of awe and guilt: “Who would forgive the resurrection of 
the dead” and “Who would grant a mortal the authority to resurrect them?” wonders Kalokairinos 
on the eve of the first excavation (41). 
The thread of deferred beginnings is often picked up by men and women sensitive to the affini-
ties between the dead, the missing, and the living. Andreas Papaoulakis, the teacher’s son, is one of 
them. His nickname is “αποθαμένος” (the dead one), having been presumed dead during the Asia 
Minor Disaster (1922) and mourned by his family. Andreas is fascinated by the fate of the niece of 
Kalokairinos. He feels he has obscure ties to the Kalokairinos family, through his father’s friendship 
with Minos, and to Skevo through their mutual experience of deferred thanatos (death). It is rumor-
ed that Skevo was killed in the basement of her own house, where she was hiding with her child, 
until a woman in Islamic dress (an old employee of the family) turns up in Herakleion years later 
claiming to have witnessed Skevo’s abduction by a Turkish officer (99). A soldier later claims to have 
spoken to Skevo in a village in Albania (109), and the woman, who was “τουρκεμένη” (became a 
Turk/ Islamised), identifies herself as the Cretan lady (113). However, an investigator, who is sent by 
Skevo’s family to make further inquiries, reaches the conclusion that the story was false (119). 
Andreas does not actively look for Skevo. Rather, her disappearance haunts him. He sees similarities 
between the missing Skevo and a French woman, Angele, with whom he had a fleeting affair that 
was interrupted by his decision to join the Greek army and fight for the Great Idea. Other rumors 
surface: that Skevo was rescued by a Turkish officer and now lives in Athens or Salonika. In 1958, 
Andreas, his wife Stella, his brother Sifis, and his wife Paraskevi, whom Andreas insists on calling 
Skevo, visit a monastery in Chania. An old nun asks him if Skevo is still alive, throwing Andreas into 
confusion and making him think of the folk tale question, “Is king Alexander alive?” The nun is the 
same woman who came ashore in Herakleion several decades ago. In 1978, Ariadne, Andreas’s niece, 
asks about the Kalokairinos family, impressed, as she says, since childhood by his mythic name. An-
dreas wants Skevo remembered, especially since “she must be dead by now” (341). He admits having 
chosen the name Ariadne for his niece as a symbolic reference to the death and rebirth of nature and 
to Skevo’s αφάνεια (invisibility) (342). In the Cretan version of the myth of Persephone, who was 
abducted by Hades, the former is also known as Ariadne. 
Haunting is history in fragments—the opposite of a definite beginning, as well as the opposite of a 
definite end: “There is no definitive ending” the Teacher (the Cretan author Kazantzakis) tells An-
dreas in his dream. This is the reason, he adds, why we throw ourselves to the flames of war, love, or 
poetry (270). This is the reason, we might add, that we are tormented by the possibility of failure and 
forgetting. 
In his work, Hauntings: Psychoanalysis and Ghostly Transmission, Stephen Frosh notes that a ghost 
is not a missing person, but a social figure. If followed, he argues, it will lead you to a dense site 
23 Slavoj Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies (London: Verso Press, 1997). Throughout the book, Žižek discusses the narrative 
construction of inaugural moments, first times, and other points of origin upon which national mythologies usually 
thrive, as a manipulation of time and an artificial separation of “our” law and “our” right from “theirs.”
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of social life.24 Isn’t Skevo such a ghost? Isn’t she the representative of the vanishing upper class of 
Herakleion, and of an epoch coming to an abrupt end? Frosh further notes that the return of ghosts 
is sometimes motivated by injustice.25 Isn’t there a horrible suspicion that Skevo’s family gave up on 
her too soon, after her husband remarried (263)? And didn’t Saint Minas save her father’s illegitimate 
offspring, a little boy named after him, instead of the beautiful Skevo and her own son? Pity and 
envy are inextricably linked in the human psyche.
Dead ends and fruitless inquiries are also an integral part of that psyche, since the psyche lives in 
fragments, not in totalities. For Heidegger, the journey of being though time is like a wood path, a 
foray into being in the world where one’s gaze should be fixed on infinity, not on specific answers.26 
“Am I alive?” wonders Andreas Papaoulakis, the one marked “dead” (141, 142). This is not a sim-
ple question of historical selfhood, but a question of being through time. For Andreas, thinking in 
numbers, in calendar time, leads nowhere. He marks time by his periodic returns to his birthplace 
(128); by the ongoing symbolic reconfiguration of knowledge and memory—”in the dark kaleido-
scope of time the norm is restructuring and reconstitution rather than the normal flow of things,” he 
says (133); by the knowledge that he and his brother are “outside time”; by reminiscence triggered 
through fleeting similarities between people, situations and forms; by feeling that there is an outside 
of language—like an old love reduced to a scream before succumbing to “aglossia” (162). The secret 
of keeping time in motion, then, is to postpone answering the question “am I alive?” and, by exten-
sion, not to be preoccupied with the end. Thus, Andreas feels awkward when his niece Rodanthi asks 
him to entertain the family gathering with “that story that ends well.” “How does a story end?” he 
wonders (205). Human time is thanatology, but it is the deferral of death—in fact, the forgetting of 
the end—that creates time.27 
This rather private experience of time is counter-balanced by the time of others, the social and 
historical time. The socio-historical determination of subjectivity, far from being an expression of 
helplessness in the face of the sweeping forces of history, is a condition of responsibility and care.28 
Andreas Papaoulakis knows this well: one has an obligation to transmit memories to younger gener-
ations—not necessarily complete stories, but a legacy of curiosity and care. In that context, Andreas’s 
attachment to the ghost of Skevo and Patouchonikos’s memories, which are as random as ‘a pack of 
shuffled cards’ (246), are just as important as the “real” historical events that gave rise to them. Such 
transmissions form the necessary network of secondary retentions that resist the commodification of 
time typical of consumer societies.29 These repeated transmissions, especially when families gath-
24 Stephen Frosh, Hauntings: Psychoanalysis and Ghostly Transmission (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013), 44.
25 Ibid., 45.
26 R. Polt, Heidegger: An Introduction (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), 25.
27 Stiegler, Technics and Time, 187.
28 For the notion of care Stiegler draws on Heidegger’s sorge (concern of one’s own) and besorgen (care of something or 
someone) as modes of concern for the self and the other. Stiegler borrows Heidegger’s definitions in order to emphasize 
the relational and plural (we) nature of becoming, as the Heideggerian concept relies not so much on formal knowledge 
as on informal know-how. Michael Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 35-37.
29 What “I” retain, argues Stiegler, constitutes my present and my sense of time. Secondary retentions which comprise 
part of the “we” are characterized by reciprocity: “received, selected, projected and lived by myself and others.” For 
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er, create periodicity. Calendarity, argues Stiegler, the simplest way of marking of time, defines the 
rendezvous of the “we” and makes possible diachronic possibilities.30 Preserving diachronicity and 
the rich fabric of memory is an act of becoming, and becoming is always social and collective. This is 
exactly what the Papaoulakis family does in their regular gatherings. 
At this point we should ask: what is a labyrinth? It is a locus of diachronicity and a very complex 
object. It is the city of Herakleion and its narrow streets (45); the place from which one must escape, 
either for love or money (77); the sensations and colours experienced by the living (110); time as 
it unfolds, twists and turns (120). It is Skevo as Ariadne and Persephone guiding her teenage love, 
Federico (160); life in death and death in life (168); a calendar year which opens with a brother’s 
murder, and the truce with the labyrinth around Christmas (224). It is all things that come to pass 
in a cycle, teaching people not be too proud or vain (225); the nun’s inquiry about Skevo, which acts 
as a thread (μήτος) (257); and blood meandering (που κουλουριαζόταν) in the labyrinth (299). It is 
invisibility (αδιαφάνεια) and secrets—the existence and possible reversal of which might offer an exit 
from the labyrinth (346). It is the thread of an unexamined and unexaminable century (ανεξερεύνητος 
αιώνας) (387). 
Why “ανεξερεύνητος”? Because it is lived and inexhaustible. The labyrinth, hypothesized Minos Ka-
lokairinos, was a quarry near the place of Knossos. Found and not found, the Labyrinth is supported 
by the certainty that the earth is rich with treasures, but gives only fragments. In trauma studies the 
locus of a secreted trauma is often called a “crypt.” Might we then propose that the Cretan Labyrinth 
is the local version of a crypt, a powerful locus of elision and certainty that “something” should be 
there? The crypt/labyrinth is not an addendum to history; it is history that constantly reproduces 
itself.31 A century of labyrinths compels us to think about the concepts of temporality and being 
differently, embracing the opacities of subjectivity and memory. The Labyrinth contains the desire 
to remember and its opposite, the desire to forget—although the latter, at times, feels like a betrayal. 
Paraskevi knows this well. Despite being happily married to her second husband, she keeps a picture 
of Sifis in her bag, checking it regularly to see if it has changed. Love and ambivalence mean that 
the dead must be missed but also laid to rest. One day she finally decides she no longer cares if the 
picture changes or stays the same (386). The preservation of memory has been linked to melancholia, 
especially in the context of national literatures. In Freud’s terms, melancholia is a refusal to give up 
the dead, and despite being widely accepted as indispensable to cultural memory, is a pathological 
state.32 In mourning, the lost object is gradually given up. In melancholia, it is preserved whole in its 
Stiegler the individual and the group cannot be thought of without one another. Any process affects both, the two chang-
ing with one another. This is because the group and the individual look up to the same pre-individual funds, “woven of 
the expectations shaping and configuring secondary and collective retentions” and “constituted by collective secondary 
retentions.” Stiegler, The Decadence of Industrial Democracies: Disbelief and Discredit, Volume 1, trans. Daniel Ross and S. 
Arnold (London: Polity Press, 2011), 112-13.
30 Bernard Stiegler, Acting Out, trans. David Barinson, Daniel Ross, and Patrick Crogan (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2009), 50.
31 Frosh, Hauntings, 44.
32 Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholy: On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement,” in The Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 14: Papers on Metapsychology and Other Works, trans. and ed. James Stratchey 
(London: Hogarth, 1991), 237-258.
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absence, with potentially catastrophic consequences. As Frosh points out, the foreclosure of mourn-
ing as a possibility enables a dynamic of regret which often takes the shape of a messianic secularism, 
leading to the violent resurgence of nationalism.33 The eighty-year old Andreas seems to be making 
this connection when he finally decides that some ghosts must to be laid to rest, among them his 
patriotic ideals and the ghost of Skevo. Upon doing so, he is no longer afraid that her “death” would 
mean his own death (262). He is no longer afraid of the lack of resolution that this significant step 
incurs: “What do I know?” he wonders. “I do not even know my brother’s killer?” (336). 
Badiou speaks of the century’s obsession with absolute beginnings, absolute ends, and absolute clar-
ity. From the other end of the century, Andreas Papaoulakis proposes embracing the lack of origins 
and secure knowledge and the fluidity of the Labyrinth as alternatives. The uncertainty of the laby-
rinth thus parallels what Badiou calls the “impassable true.”34 This should not be confused with polit-
ical, social or financial uncertainty devised by dominant ideologies as a way of keeping the masses on 
their toes. Rather, the impassable true is a psychic disposition of living an affected life,35 which means 
caring for oneself and others and resisting the stupidity and the impoverishment of the intellectual 
life effected by polarizing ideologies.36 The Labyrinth, then, is not a counter-history or a locus of 
political and historical melancholia, but history as a nexus of entanglements, regressions, repetitions, 
repudiations, forgetting, revisions, resurfacing, defenses, misrecognitions, symbolic amendments, 
aporias, and fragments, which resists the orthos logos of final interpretations. Andreas Papaoulakis 
concludes: “Our only legacy is imagination” (368). The Labyrinth must be imagination—living sub-
stance that cannot be owned or appropriated by any single cause. 
Racism, Misogyny and Hatred of the Self
At this point I wish to take a thread from the Ο αιώνας των Λαβυρίνθων and transplant it to Φωτιές 
του Ιούδα, Στάχτες του Οιδίποδα: “The souls of women are not allowed to return even from involun-
tary sin.”37 I wish to set this ostracization in the context of another haunting, and an observation by 
Castoriadis regarding religious hatred and racism: “True racism,” argues Castoriadis, “does not per-
mit others to recant… Racism does not want the [religious] conversion of the other but his death.”38 
This desire for the death of the other is a desire to abolish difference, to regress to a mythical state 
of being prior to encountering the other. In psychoanalytic terms, racism, xenophobia and misog-
yny mobilize paranoid defenses, seeking to project outwards any threats to an Ego that is insecure 
and unwilling to deal with its own vulnerability. Such a broad explanation, however, does not mean 
33 Stephen Frosh, Hauntings: Psychoanalysis and Ghostly Transmission (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013).
34 Badiou, The Century, 89.
35 Bernard Stiegler, What Makes Life Worth Living: On Pharmacology, trans. Daniel Ross (London: Polity Press, 2013), 
41.
36 Stiegler, “Doing and Saying Stupid Things in the 20th Century: Bêtise and Animality in Deleuze and Derrida,” in 
Angelaki 18, no. 1: 159- 175.
37 Rhea Galanaki, Φωτιές του Ιούδα, Στάχτες του Οιδίποδα (Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Καστανιώτη, 2009), 258.
38 Castoriadis, World in Fragments, 27.
Article: Angie Voela
JMH 34 (2019): Special Issue
117
much on its own and needs to be studied within specific historical parameters.39 In this section I dis-
cuss the racism and misogyny in Φωτιές του Ιούδα as a symptom of our time. More specifically, I focus 
on how racism and misogyny concentrate around two poles: the non-recognition of the individuality 
of (the) woman and what I would call, for the moment, the (dis)organization of knowledge into 
forgetting and blindness. 
Galanaki has a long-standing interest in women encountering the limitations of their own epoch. 
In Ελένη ή ο Κανένας (Eleni or Nobody), for instance, she examines femininity as evading the strict 
boundaries of time and place.40 In traditional terms, women, especially of an older age, are often 
taken to be guardians of memory, like the old Angeliko in the present novel. This tender timeless-
ness, however, turns toxic in the hands of the hateful. An indiscriminate attribution of knowledge to 
“the woman” as “the one who is supposed to know” quickly slips into conceiving of her as “the one 
who had always known,” and then as both the one who “knew in advance” and “the one to blame.” 
To put it in mythic terms, it is as if Eve always knew, and so did Jocasta. The investment of the other 
(woman or xenos) with absolute knowledge immerses the community in a labyrinth of ignorance and 
forgetting, producing a web of quasi-causalities, the dynamics of which must be comprehended in 
their contemporary historical setting. 
Near the beginning of the novel, Martha arrives at a mountainous Cretan village shortly after her 
mother’s death. The latter was no longer capable “to put words into the right order,” to bequeath 
her daughter a coherent life story.41 Instead, the story was left incomplete, suspended “at a three way 
crossing” (21, 24). This oblique reference to Oedipus Rex makes the young woman the tragic origi-
nator and addressee of her own inquiry.42 To a certain extent we are all guilty of a similar desire: we 
expect to know what our name means, since a proper name assigns one a place in the network of 
symbolic relations. A xenos, however, is emplaced in an existing community bereft of such context.
Martha’s first encounter with the village is at the kafeneion, where she stops to ask for information in 
order to find her bearings. The men are reserved in their welcome and surprised the politicians did 
not appoint a “local teacher” to their village (28). It is election time. The first woman she meets is the 
old Angeliko, a maternal woman who considers her lodgers to be her children. Angeliko is intrigued 
by Martha’s first name but says nothing. The novel combines different narrations: Martha’s interior 
monologue addressed to her dead mother; the story of Kimbourea, Juda’s mother; the memory of 
39 Ibid., 26.
40 Angie Voela, “Patterns and Scripts: The Revision of Feminine Heterosexuality in Feminist Theory and Literature,” Eu-
ropean Journal of Women’s Studies 18, no. 1 (2010): 1-12; Voela, “Heterotopia Revisited: Foucault and Lacan on Feminine 
Subjectivity,” Subjectivity 4, no. 2 (2011): 168-182.
41 Rhea Galanaki, Φωτιές του Ιούδα, Στάχτες του Οιδίποδα (Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Καστανιώτη, 2009), 20.
42 Like Oedipus, Martha takes it upon herself to investigate the past of others (her grandparents) without realizing the 
tragic impact this will have upon her own life. She is totally innocent of social blame and a victim of racism and misogy-
ny. Lacan, however, speaks of another “guilt,” the very desire that drives one to seek knowledge in the first place. A sub-
ject becomes “guilty” from the moment that the desire of the Other becomes his or her desire. A good example is Hamlet 
who tries to pay the dead father’s symbolic debt. Oedipus, who “does not know” in advance, must pledge his word to the 
investigation of the Theban plague, offering himself as guarantee in an act of anticipation. This is what seals his fate and 
makes him a hostage to his word. Alenka Zupančič, Ethics of the Real (London: Verso Press, 2000), 182; 191. This is how 
Martha, and all of us, take it upon ourselves to investigate the “past” of ourselves and others.
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Marta and Zaharis guarded by old Angeliko, and the narration of present events unfolding between 
a spring time election campaign and Easter Sunday. The local teacher, nicknamed Harakas (ruler) for 
being fond of the old-fashioned implement of chastisement, instantly dislikes Martha because of her 
Jewish surname (43). 
The village seems to have forgotten Marta and Zaharis. Angeliko remembers their wedding, which 
took place at the peak of the civil war, and the αντάρτες (guerillas) taking the bride to the mountains. 
Marta and Zaharis were cousins, and she was eight years his senior, “old enough to be his mother” 
(59). “Who ever dared marry their own mother, who else apart from the lawless, wretched Judas?” 
the villagers used to exclaim, but Angeliko does not quite remember where the poem Judas the 
incestuous came from (60). Angeliko also recalls that the village did not blame Zaharis as much as 
Marta, because he was a man and could do as he pleased (61). The couple was never seen again. The 
locals “offloaded” them with all the sins of the mind and the body, real and imaginary, and proceeded 
to exorcise and exile them (να τους εξορκޖσει και να τους εξορޖσει) by deleting them from their memory 
(66). 
Power precipitates events. The xenophobic tendencies of the local community are exacerbated by the 
teacher, who is said to be well-connected with politician on both sides of the ideological spectrum 
and writes for an Athenian newspaper (72). Harakas is a nationalist who urges Cretans to keep their 
island clean of immigrants, dirty tourists, Jews and Muslims (73). The villagers are not directly racist 
but complacent and stagnant. This complacency is challenged by Petros, Angeliko’s favorite neph-
ew, whom Martha first meets on election Sunday. The old ways, Petros argues in the kafeneion, are 
a façade for a life of corrupt money which is abated by the local politicians and, occasionally, by the 
judiciary and the press. The men are openly hostile to his views and tell him that they have no time 
for preachers and amateur leftist politicians (87). 
The regressive tendencies of the village are summed up by the custom of burning the effigy of Judas 
on Easter Sunday—regressing to the Dark Ages, as Petros says (89). Harakas uses this custom to 
imbue and normalize racism. All the school children are involved in its long preparation, gathering 
wood and helping build the effigy, and in the process, a young child, whom everyone calls “the little 
Albanian” instead of using his first name, is bullied into providing the clothes for Judas and beaten 
by the other kids for failing to do so (145). The custom, muses Martha, is the children’s initiation to 
social discrimination and power relations. It is preserved both in symbolic form, the so-called “cathar-
sis” of the village, and in essence by perpetuating discrimination and violence against the weak (147). 
The children look forward to the big fire that will burn Judas the traitor, the slave, and the αιμομޖχτης 
(incestuous) (149). 
The ritual burning of Judas the incestuous traitor is not a mere custom but a cause unto itself which 
lacks rational justification. It is subtended by a compulsion to repeat, characterized by the main 
operations of the unconscious, namely, condensation and displacement. Condensation conflates 
slavery—“is slavery a sin?” wonders Martha—with incest and betrayal. Displacement projects onto 
the non-Greek (xenos) the Greek mythical hamartia (sin) par excellence (Oedipal incest) and subse-
quently receives all as coming from outside of both the self and the community.
The above logic of equivalences allows us to see how racism, as an expression of inferiority and evil 
(xenos, slave), becomes tinted with sexuality and knowledge. The moment racist fixations occur, 
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argues Castoriadis, the others are not only excluded as individuals or a collectivity, but are endowed 
with a series of attributes—first among them an evil and perverse essence justifying in advance 
everything one might propose to subject them to.43 A woman is by definition vulnerable and hence 
violable, much as a migrant child is vulnerable and violable. Woman, xenos, and slave must know 
their position. How can the slave not recognize the master? How can the xenos not accept her inferi-
ority? How can a mother (Jocasta, Kimbourea) not recognize the son she is taking to her bed? How 
can a woman not accept the sexual advances of a man? A woman is supposed to know her place—
that is, her place as a sexual object. This latent sexual knowledge exceeds individuality and erases 
the person. In the village memory, all relationships are intensely sexualized and racialized. And it is 
this excessive affect, this intense sexualization, that the village guards against and forgets. This is the 
origin of all knowledge and sin. It places woman out of time, in a perilous position of omniscience. It 
splits women into two: old women who know and are not in the cycle of reproduction, and younger 
women who must be hemmed in and kept under surveillance. At the same time, such an irrational 
demand (to know her place) addressed to any woman and xenos illustrates the perverse desire of the 
racist/misogynist to be recognized as master. 
Such gestures, argues Castoriadis, often conceal an unconscious self-hatred. In the recesses of the 
egocentric fortress, a voice says: “Our walls are made of plastic, our acropolis of papier-mâché.”44 This 
attitude inaugurates a different kind of “haunting,” a relentless refusal of reality which eventually 
become detestation “of the individual into which the psychical monad has had to be transformed and 
which it continues, phantom like, to haunt.”45 The secure self can bear both truth and lies without 
being destroyed; hatred of the self, then, nourishes the most driven forms of hatred and a monstrous 
psychical displacement, by means of which the subject defends against affect by changing the object.46 
This psychic attitude erupts in violent aggression, in gratuitous and uncalled for acts.47 This is why 
the other-woman-xenos must always be guilty of knowing and cannot recant: the psychic demand 
behind racism and misogyny is irresolute. Seeking the absolute resolution of death and abolition of 
the other is a way to lulling the fragile mythical ego.
Not recognizing the individuality of the other/woman does not reinforce the group. On the con-
trary, it turns the group into a herd, promulgating stupidity,48 which is represented in this novel by 
the lack of historical and poetic/aesthetic knowledge. For Stiegler any regression from rationality 
always constitutes a political issue, leading directly to a regression from the democratic imperative of 
examining received laws in order to determine whether they are still appropriate for us or not. The 
ancient Greek polis, argues Stiegler, was democratic precisely because it practiced the examination 
and transgression-interpretation of the Law. Failure to do so is a failure of democracy, but such an 
43 Castoriadis, World in Fragments, 26.
44 Ibid., 29.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Frosh, Hauntings, 40.
48 Bernard Stiegler, “Doing and Saying Stupid Things in the 20th Century: Bêtise and Animality in Deleuze and Derri-
da.” Angelaki 18, no. 1 (2013): 159- 175.
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operation can only be carried out when the community has faith in the Law as an abstract-noetic en-
tity. Stiegler considers that contemporary control societies are war societies, where polemos (conflict) is 
being replaced by evil. The war Stiegler is talking about is internal and inherent to capitalist culture. 
It concerns the decline of judgment and hermeneia (interpretation), and the failure of the political to 
produce pacification in a public arena (agora). As the civic values of philia (friendship), justice, and 
shame subside, we are left with a war without rules, in which the contract replaces the Law.49 This 
is why Petros’s words jar with the villagers when he accuses them of profiting and enjoying at the 
expense of the Law. In that context, the problem of misogyny and racism as adherence to historically 
transmitted (unexamined) principles belies the fraying of the communal bonds and demonstrates 
the loss of their symbolic elasticity. Galanaki, then, lays her finger on the difference between έθιμο 
(custom) as a way of punctuating time and έθιμο as a pseudo-event, a mock-important moment. As 
a pseudo-event the burning of Judas expresses the insignificance and messianism of a community 
lacking in self-determination and scope. At that point history ends and retreats into myth, becoming 
a regressive history without parousia (presence).50 When the myth is no longer told, when it estab-
lishes its fable as axioms, it loses is “magnificent indefiniteness,”51  producing obsession with histori-
cal fidelity and an implacable fidelity to “a particular scene of the past.”52 Viewed through a psycho-
analytic lens, the immigrant and the woman, vulnerability inflicted upon them, are too similar to the 
self, and remind the self of its intolerable weakness. Contemporary philosophers like Stiegler do not 
hesitate to attribute such phenomena to the “proletarianization” of groups and individuals, to being 
deprived of means of creativity, expression and self-determination. Badiou echoes this concern when 
he observes that the new norms are definitely regressive: money, family, and elections—in other 
words, material profit, care limited to one’s own, and the synchronization/reduction of democracy 
into an event that is fast becoming pseudo-political—have come to dominate.53 The elision of “wom-
an,” the outbursts of racism, the cultural léthe and the political proletarianization of groups that feel 
increasingly powerless and marginalized leave us with an aporia and the end of the century: How do 
we re-negotiate our fidelity to the ideals of democracy and individual autonomy?
“Je signerai Louis”: Rationality, Fidelity, Singularity 
Rebellion is its own justification says Badiou.54 The significance of this statement comes into relief when 
rebellion chimes with Eros and Thanatos—not love, not the sexual relationship, and not the emotions 
deemed admissible by the social body. In Θα υπογράφω Λουί (I Shall Sign as Loui) it amounts to exam-
ining one’s life and admitting that one would not have done anything essentially different, even when 
running the risk of hurting their addressee, the lover to whom one entrusts their life’s work.
49 Bernard Stiegler, Uncontrollable Societies of Disaffected Individuals: Disbelief, Discredit, trans. D. Ross (London: Polity 
Press, 2013).
50 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2006), 34.
51 Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, trans. Ian Hamilton Grant (London: Sage Press, 2004), 152.
52 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 47.
53 Badiou, The Century, 66.
54 Ibid., 143.
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Let us indulge in a generalization: having failed to realize the aspiration of the nineteenth century, 
the twentieth develops a preference for bringing to light the untrue and the misrecognized.55 This 
passion for the unseen and the unconscious, in essence, tries to maintain fidelity to a cause which, 
like a revolution, must remain an (in)complete project. A small error sums up the fragility of this 
pursuit: quoting Dante, Louis writes “maremma” (lower case) instead of Maremma (upper case). Is 
this a deliberate move or an unlikely oversight by a man renown or his learning? Truth, argues Žižek, 
arises from misrecognition.56 
In the long love letter that is his address to Louisa, Louis embarks on the retelling of his story, which 
the other knows in advance. In it, Louis is born aboard the ship that brings the family to safety and 
exile on the eve of the Greek revolution.57 Being born at sea marks him as displaced and diasporic 
from birth, and the adult Louis looks west, to revolutionary Europe, for intellectual inspiration. 
Looking back, speaking from the moment of death, the “I” recounts the absence of origin at birth, 
both for himself and the nation with which he is contemporaneous. The letters to Louisa, written 
from the end, speak of human time as deferral and thanatology. But even from this definitive ending, 
one can only speak the failure of totalizing the self and the gap between the formation of knowledge 
and the limits of self-knowledge.58 A similar distance opens up in the field of love—be that the love 
of an ideal (revolution) or a woman. Louis renounces the imaginary mastery of the male and does 
not wish to “own” Louisa. The latter must remain elusive—μακρινή και για τούτο η ޖδια (distant and 
because of this the same)—even after her husband’s death (202). This peculiar love (101), which has 
something of the medieval courtly love, is also inspired by the ethos of the Enlightenment, and the 
plea for the emancipation of sentiment.59 Louis writes: 
Η ήττα της αγάπης μ’ εδޖδαξε τι θα σήμαινε ο θρޖαμβός της. Η ήττα των επαναστάσεων 
προσπάθησε κι αυτή να με διδάξει για το θρޖαμβό τους. Όμως, Λουޖζα, πόσο μπορούν να 
μας παρηγορούνε διδαχές και θρޖαμβοι ανέφικτοι; [...] ΄Ωσπου να σου ξαναγράψω αύριο, 
Λουޖζα, δεν απαρνούμαι τον ρομαντισμό μου. Μιλώ για την απόρριψη των παλαιών 
συμβάσεων, την παρατήρηση της φύσης και την ταύτιση μαζޖ της, την πνοή του απεޖρου 
στο τετελεσμένο, την φαντασޖα που ενοικεޖ την ύλη μας, τις χαώδεις αντιφάσεις, την 
εξιδανޖκευση του έρωτα και του θανάτου. (101)
The defeat of love has taught me what her triumph would stand for. The defeat of the 
revolutions also tried to teach me about their triumph. However, Louise, how much 
can the unattainable teachings and triumphs console us? […] Until I write to you 
again, Louise, I do not deny my romanticism. I speak of the rejection of old norms, 
the observation of nature and me identifying with her, the breath of infinity to that 
55 Ibid., 49.
56 Slavoj Žižek, “The Truth Arises from Misrecognition,” in Lacan and the Subject of Language, ed. Ellie Ragland-Sullivan 
and Mark Bracher (London: Routledge, 1991), 188-225.
57 Galanaki, Θα υπογράφω Λουί, 18.
58 Judith Butler, Giving Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 19.
59 Paschalis Kitromilides, Enlightenment and Revolution: The Making of Modern Greece (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2013), 205.
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which has been determined, the imagination that resides in our matter, the vast con-
tradictions, the idealization of love and death.
By the same token, and because he remains faithful to the promise of a better world, Louis refuses 
to profit from his public office, unlike the new bourgeois governing elite. He remains a “servant” of 
the new Greek state and eventually becomes poor, having lost his status and paternal inheritance. 
Love and revolution are thus maintained in failure and deferral. They produce Louis as an eccentricity 
or a remainder, radically other to the historical becoming of the nation and his contemporaries. He 
writes: “Ο έρωτας μας υπήρξε μια μορφή συνωμοσޖας, μια μικρή ιστορޖα μέσα στην ανεξιλέωτη μεγάλη” 
(“Our love existed as a form of conspiracy, a small story within an unredeemable large one”) (33). 
To redeem is, among other things, to elicit value, to surrender to the capitalist-bourgeois mentality 
of use and profit here and now. In psychoanalysis, the delay of gratification constitutes the first step 
towards psychic maturity. The child learns to wait, “holding in” the frustration and aggression this 
might cause and gradually building the necessary mental space to accommodate higher order rep-
resentations.60 Capitalism promises instant gratification through the availability of commodities and 
objects. It strives to annul the delay which essentially supports Desire and, by extension, the aspira-
tion to higher ideals. The intellectual Louis sees this loss of aspiration everywhere, from the neglect 
of public spaces in Patras to the erosion of the standards in entertainment (50-51). This is not just 
bourgeois elitism, but a profound concern at witnessing the advent of popular culture qua erosion 
of distinction and difference. The same faith to the ideal makes Louis adhere to Law and Justice as 
abstract principles of civic life, as opposed to the concrete rule of law which is relentlessly applied by 
Louisa’s husband when chasing the bandits of Western Greece. For the intellectual, aesthete, revolu-
tionary, politician, and lover, none of these aspects can be subsumed by a single field, by one priority. 
So why is this man of clear vision held back down by the maremma, entwined, in Louisa’s fragrant 
hair, with the Maremma (126)? Maremma is the failure of the European revolutionaries (140); 
Louisa’s mourning for the assassination of her husband and the anxiety provoked when the object of 
love unexpectedly appears available (163); the town square built on marsh land and the sea of Patras 
(168, 91). They all echo Louis’s youth, his visit to the Italian Maremma and his first attempt to get 
into the Comedia Divina (να εισχωρήσω) (84). Maremma is, finally, the impossibility of a firm inter-
pretation when it comes to the meaning of revolution: 
Σκέφτομαι, σκέφτομαι και ματασκέφτομαι μήπως καθε διατύπωση για την επανάσταση 
οφεޖλει να περιέχει την προοπτική της εκτροπή της... Και ποιος, αλοޖμονο, θα το κρޖνει; Ιδού 
και πάλι η Μaremmα. (182)
I am thinking, I am thinking and rethinking if every enunciation about the revolu-
tion ought to include the perspective of its deflection… And who, alas, will judge it? 
Behold once again the Maremma.
Might the word “διατύπωση” provide a lead to what is at stake in this statement? The error (of the 
pen or the typesetter’s hand) that reduced Maremma to maremma captures the fall of the lofty ideal 
into the incredibly mundane reality of all endeavors and, at the same time, the minute distance that 
60 Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, trans. David Nicholson-Smith (London: 
Karnac Books, 1988), 114. This is also known in Kleinian psychoanalysis as the depressive position. 
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separates the sublime from the ordinary. In that sense, an inadvertent error does not sum up this 
man of exquisite taste, but shows, to him above all, the ironic limits of one’s endeavors. 
Louis asks: “Υπήρξα άνθρωπος της εποχής μου;” (Was I a man of my time?) (197). We grow up twice: 
first, when we remove ourselves from the shadow of our parents, and second, when we see clearly 
that our lives, our ideas, our system of beliefs, and even our views of history, are symptoms of the 
times in which we live. Louis speaks of error: 
το λάθος που διαφέντεψε τη ζωή μου, εάν μπορώ να επικαλεσθώ κάτι ως λάθος, εޖναι ότι 
δεν μπόρεσα να αποφασޖσω αμετάκλειτα τη θέση μου εޖτε προς τον έρωτα, εޖτε—τολμώ 
να πω—ως προς την Ιστορޖα, εޖτε κυρޖως ως προς το αναμεταξύ τους θέατρο. Ήμουν 
ερμηνευτής, ήμουν θεατής, ήμουν δημιουργός; (135).
The mistake that governed my life, if I can cite something as a mistake, was that I was 
not able to irrevocably decide my position either towards love, or—I dare say —to-
wards History, or mainly towards the play between them. Was I an interpreter, was I 
a spectator, was I a creator?
An error implies “un-truth” but is just as effective a signifier as any “truth” when it comes to rep-
resenting a man for his contemporaries. In either case, one cannot determine one’s own value in 
politics, in art, and, above all, in love. One is essentially at the merit of the Other as much as at the 
hands of a lover. Butler draws attention to the ethical dimension of the failure to encompass all of 
oneself in one’s speech when addressing the other.61 This ethical failure, we could argue, acquires an 
additional dimension when the speaking subject tries to position themselves vis a vis their axioms 
and history. To put it simply, in the context of Galanaki’s work, what the simple folk of Crete per-
ceive as forces upon which they cannot prevail, the intellectual, aesthete, lover, and revolutionary 
feels, in first person, as a tremendous responsibility in the Derridean sense—a duty of singularity.62 
This is not the singularity of the “special one” or the narcissist, but of the affected and the humble, 
like Andreas Papaoulakis.  In Louis’s case, however, humility stumbles on the tension between revo-
lution as a radical break and interpretation as a tempering of the past. In reply to his own question 
“Was I a man of my time?” Louis adds: 
Νομޖζω, ναι. Αυτό το οφεޖλω στο γεγονός ότι μελέτησα παλιότερες εποχές. Η ζωή μου εޖχε 
δύο αντικρυστούς καθρέφτες, το παρελθόν και το παρόν… Καταλήγω στο συμπέρασμα ότι η 
προβολή του έρωτα σε κάτι το πολύ παλιό υπήρξε για μένα πιο αναγκαޖα και απο την προοπτική 
του μέλλοντος. (198) 
I think so, yes. I owe it to the fact that I studied times long passed. My life had two oppo-
site mirrors, the past and the present… I reach the conclusion that love’s projection upon 
something very old has been for me more important that the outlook of the future.
61 Butler, Giving Account, 40.
62 This kind of responsibility is not simply performative. In order to be responsible it is necessary to respond to what be-
ing responsible means. One is never ready for it. Responsibility suggests deciding without knowledge or independently of 
knowledge. Derrida calls the decision taken by the name of “freedom.” Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death and Literature 
and Secret, trans. David Wills (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2008), 27.
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Lacan notes that truth (of being) and knowledge (savoir) are essentially incompatible. Truth as a 
living entity cannot be captured by a deterministic history, even less so by a “successful” revolution 
which reduces its result into savoir.63 A suicide is a form of fidelity to a cause, albeit a destructive one. 
Essentially, at the end of his life Louis refuses the knowledge of the melancholic subject who will 
hold on to the failure of his cause. He chooses not to be haunted and not to remember. Suicide as a 
radical gesture of faith to the revolution goes all the way: first, one abolishes class, privilege and social 
relations, then the object of love itself—both love of the other and revolution. And since the rational 
self perceives itself as co-extensive to both, there is only one final gesture: to forego the self. 
There is, however, another mode of fidelity. “The question of fidelity” writes Stiegler, “is an aporia.”64 
We cannot remain faithful to what remains constant throughout. Thus, fidelity concerns how to 
remain fragile and faithful, as in love. Stiegler comments: “Only imbeciles do not change… And 
at the same time one must remain. Be and remain faithful to what remains.”65 Fidelity means that 
revolution should not congeal in romantic images of breaking one’s bonds, but should also admit the 
opposite, the creation of bonds. This, in my view, is the point at which historical interpretation as a 
gesture of radical separation from the past transforms our attachments from frightful hauntings into 
what in-sists and remains.
Embracing the Labyrinth, Care, and the Law
In this paper I have taken the broad view that “society is self-creation deployed as history.”66 Our 
view of history proceeds from the desire to know what lies ahead and will be returning from the 
past, as eternal repetition of the same, as inescapable fate and the compulsion to repeat. The question 
is not so much “was there something that we could have done differently,” as it is, “was there any 
tangible knowledge that could have resulted in a different present state?” The obsession with prior 
knowledge veils a different truth; namely, that there is no historical object or knowledge that could 
have served that purpose. “Discovering” and preserving such past objects promulgates a melancholic 
disposition which veils the fear of bringing an end to history.67 It is this fear that often attaches us to 
the past. In that sense, pursuing history and memory as “labyrinth” is already a daring interpretation. 
This interpretation is pharmacological and futural. By pharmacological I do not mean both “positive” 
and “negative,” but productive of difference and singularity—a pharmakon which dispels the binaries 
of unity and strife, and antagonisms of various kinds, race and gender included. Galanakis’s Laby-
rinth, as a general attitude to history, is the rewriting, undoing and preservation of the past, minus 
determinism and closure. It encompasses oblivion as the not-all of history, as well as the impassable 
truth of being and time which defies the fascination with national beginnings and origins. 
The Labyrinth challenges the future, the survival of the nation or the group, and the duty to some-
63 Jacques Lacan, “Radiophonie,” trans. Jack W. Stone, Scilicet 2/3 (1970): 26, http://www.lacantokyo.org/img/Radio-
phonie_tr_en.pdf.
64 Stiegler, Acting Out, 33.
65 Ibid.
66 Castoriadis, World in Fragments, 13.
67 Frosh, Hauntings, 62.
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how serve it as a collective obligation. The Labyrinth is the ability to tolerate fragmentation, content 
with the thought that fragments are sometimes all we need. The psychic ability to tolerate fragmenta-
tion and to survive catastrophe is essential; Bion considers catastrophe as an essential part of human 
experience.68 To experience and tolerate catastrophe is different from knowledge and even from guilt. 
The capacity to deal with catastrophe requires something equally potent. Bion calls it faith. Winn-
icott calls it creativity and the capacity to idealize.69 Psychoanalytically speaking, the latter is not the 
adherence to parental ideals or “mastery.” It is in fact Galanaki’s Labyrinth: a supple space in which 
imagination transforms and is transformed without falling into myth, without congealing into defen-
sive ideals. 
At times of crisis we often notice that difference and individuality come under attack, and people 
tend to tolerate infringements, settling for little, for the ‘”good enough” of what they are offered. A 
regression from individuality and singularity does not strengthen the community. On the contrary, 
it produces stupidity and herdishness. To ask, at that point, which axioms and which principles of 
times past we abide by, is not nostalgic, as it does not look back. Instead, it addresses the funda-
mental question: What now? Fidelity is a psychic disposition towards the future and what remains.70 
Points of dissonance and unbearable tensions in the present must be made apparent in order to de-
termine “what remains.” This is a political project and a tremendous obligation. What we hear from 
all sides, notes Badiou, is “the demand for the conservation of the old humanity and all the endan-
gered species to boot.”71 In short, we live through the revenge of what is most blind and objective in 
the economic appropriation of technics over what is most subjective and voluntary in politics.72 The 
century concludes with the impossibility of subjective novelty and the comfort of repetition, with 
the obsession of security and its irresolute reasoning: “It’s not really that bad being what you already 
are, it is and has been worse elsewhere.”73 Castoriadis reminds us that the axiom of autonomy is 
maintained by a constant inquiry and a responsibility for the laws we make. We must ask “aloud,” 
as he insists: “Why this law rather than another?” and “Is this law just?”74 From a slightly different 
perspective, and as a means of resisting the coercive forces of history, the pseudo-individualism, and 
the adverse effects of hegemonic discourses, proposes being bold towards the past, opting for “what I 
adopt as my past”75 while preserving symbolic creativity and sensibilization.76 This amounts to caring 
and living an affected life; remembering, forgetting and welcoming the fragments of Knossos as 
fragments. 
68 Michael Eigen, The Electrified Tightrope, ed. Adam Phillips (London: Karnac, 2004), 18.
69 Ibid., 136.
70 Bernard Stiegler, Acting Out, trans. David Barinson, Daniel Ross, and Patrick Crogan (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2009).
71 Badiou, The Century, 9.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., 66.
74 Castoriadis, World in Fragments, 18.
75 Stiegler, Acting Out, 45.
76 Badiou, The Century, 45, 58.
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